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IT threat evolution Q2 2017 (DPRK-related paragraph 7)

Date (as written)
2017-08-15
Year
2017

Source entries (1)

Kaspersky Securelist

IT threat evolution Q2 2017 (DPRK-related paragraph 7) · 2017-08-15
Lazarus is not just another APT group. The scale of the Lazarus group’s operations is shocking: it appears that Lazarus operates a malware factory, generating new tools as old ones are ‘burned’. The group uses various code obfuscation techniques, re-writes its own algorithms, applies commercial software protectors, and uses its own and underground packers. Typically, the group pushes rudimentary backdoors during the first stage of infection – ‘burning’ these doesn’t affect the group too much. However, if the first stage backdoor reports an interesting infection they start deploying more advanced code, carefully protecting it from accidental detection on disk: the code is wrapped into a DLL loader or stored in an encrypted container, or maybe hidden in a binary encrypted registry value. This usually comes with an installer that only the attackers can use, because they password protect it. This guarantees that automated systems – be it a public sandbox or a researcher’s environment – will never see the real payload. This level of sophistication is something that is not generally found in the cybercriminal world and requires strict organisation and control at all stages of operation. It also explains Lazarus branching out into operations to general illegal profits – operations of this kind require lots of money.
https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q2-2017/79354/

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